Florida Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 2

Article 8

January 1976

Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate:
Xenophobic or Principled Reaction?
William A. Weber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William A. Weber, Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate: Xenophobic or Principled
Reaction?, 28 Fla. L. Rev. 491 (1976).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Weber: Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate: Xenophobi
FLORIDA'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

19761

106.27 Determinations by commission; legal disposition by Department of Legal Affairs
(1) If the Commission determines that probable cause exists to believe a violation of
this chapter has occurred, the Commission shall immediately transmit such determination
to the Department of Legal Affairs for disposition pursuant to this section. The Commission
and the Department of State Division of Elections shall forthwith transmit to the Department of Legal Affairs all available information concerning the alleged violation.
(a) ...
(b) ...
(2) If the Commission determines that probable cause exists to believe a violation of
this chapter has occurred by a candidate for the office of attorney general, the Commission
shall immediately transmit such determination to the state attorney in the circuit in which
the violation occurred for disposition, pursuant to this section. The Commission and the
Department of State shall forthwith transmit to the state attorney in the circuit in which
the violation occurred all amilable information concerning the alleged violation.
(3) ...
(4) ...
Section 9. This act shall take effect upon becoming law.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES
REAL ESTATE: XENOPHOBIC OR PRINCIPLED REACTION?
ALIEN - "is derived from the Latine word alienus, and according to
the etymologie of the word, it signifieth one borne in
"I
country, under the obedience of a strange prince ....

a strange

In November 1974, President Ford signed the Foreign Investment Study
Act of 1974,2 directing the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury to conduct

a comprehensive study of foreign direct and portfolio investments in the
United States. Foreign direct investments (F.D.I.) are investments in a host

country by a foreign investor having the ability to control the operation of
3

the investment.

Included in this directive is a requirement that these de-

4
partments analyze the effects of F.D.I. in United States real property holdings.

The Act further required an analysis of the effects of federal, regional, state,

and local laws, rules, and regulations on F.D.I.5 Congress, responding to
1. 1 E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITILETON 129a (Butler & Hargraves 1853).
2. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-748, 88 Stat. 1450.
3. Id. §§2-3 Foreign portfolio investment is simply noncontrol purchases of United States
securities; the investor holds these securities but does not have a significant voice in the
management or control. For statistical purposes, the United States Commerce Depart-

ment uses 25% or greater foreign ownership of voting stock as the test for "control."
Statement of Peter M. Flanigan, in Hearings on Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States Before the Subcomm. on Internat'lFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
The Department of Commerce, however, reportedly plans to tighten this test to 10%
foreign ownership for its future determinations of F.D.I. 1974 NALr J. RP. 1311. In light
of recent attempts by foreign investors to aid ailing American corporations with massive
loans, a test of control limited to voting stock does not seem to recognize the business
realities of such a debtor-creditor relationship.
4. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-478, §5(b), 88 Stat. 1450.
5. Id. §5(3).
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recent large F.D.I. in the United States,' stated that the act's purpose is to
"increase the understanding of the implications of [F.D.I.] both within the
United States Government and among the public at large, and thus to help
lay the foundation for a national policy concerning foreign investments in
7
the United States."
Foreign direct investment in real estate occupies a unique position in
the array of F.D.I. possibilities. Because the ownership of land in the United
States has traditionally been regulated by the several states, foreign investors
are faced with a hodgepodge of laws regulating their real property investments.8 In addition to state regulation, the federal government concurrently
acts in this area when exercising its power to enter into treaties and executive
agreements.9 Although in several recent cases the constitutional rights of
aliens have been expanded by the United States Supreme Court, 10 these
cases address only the rights of resident aliens, leaving the rights of nonresident alien investors unclearly defined." Yet, despite this complexity and
uncertainty, F.D.I. in United States realty is becoming increasingly lucrative
to foreign investors.
It is well settled in international law that each country has the right to
prescribe who may own property within its borders. 1 2 This note will examine
the extent of United States regulation of F.D.I. in real estate and comment
on the propriety and effectiveness of such regulation in light of the American
legal system and national economic and political objectives. In exploring
F.D.I. in realty, several issues arise. State regulation naturally invites a discussion of Federalism and the extent of the federal preemptive power. Because of international interaction by treaty and executive agreement,
reciprocity becomes an issue and a discussion of foreign treatment of the
United States direct investment in realty abroad is thus relevant. Finally,
the constitutional rights of aliens must be considered in the regulation of
F.D.I. This note will first survey recent F.D.I. in United States real estate
and current methods of domestic regulation; a discussion of several foreign
countries' methods of control will be followed by a treatment of the federal
constitutional issues.
RECENT

F.D.I. IN

UNITED STATES REAL ESTATE

The threshold issue in F.D.I. is the meaning of the term "alien" or
"foreign." An individual alien investor is "one born out of the jurisdiction

6.
7.

See text accompanying notes 20-29 infra.
H.R. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in 3 U.S. CODE CONC. 8, AD. NEWS 5957 (1974).

8. See note 73 infra.
9. See note 81 infra.
10. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971).
11. See text accompanying notes 139-171 infra.
12. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970): "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State or Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
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of the United States, and who has not been naturalized ... ,,13 The traditional
term describing individual foreign investors has been alien, while business
entities have been referred to as foreign;'4 however, these terms will be used
interchangeably herein. The focus of this note is on alien investors who would
probably stipulate their alienage and would continue to retain allegiance to
their home country.
Aliens are further classified as resident or nonresident; 5 a classification
that may be crucial in determining such issues as constitutional rights 6 and
tax liabilities. 17 Broadly speaking, a nonresident alien is one who is residing
out of the country; however, the territorial limits of residency vary according
to the nature of the dispute and the applicable law.:' Consequently, the
foreign direct investor may be declared resident or nonresident depending
on the nature of his investment and the context in which the issue arises. For
purposes of this discussion, the investor in realty will be assumed to be a
nonresident alien individual. 9
During 1972 the largest foreign direct investors in this country were
the Japanese, who, with an investment of $105 million, increased their annual
rate of investment fivefold over that of 1971.20 Japanese holdings of real
estate, predominately resort properties in Hawaii, have reportedly surpassed
$350 million in value.21 It is believed, however, that a catalyst for the sudden
13. Cf. note 70 infra, for statutes demonstrating the different terms used in defining a
foreign direct investor.
14. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 473 (1912). Alien is defined under the
Immigration and Nationality Act as any person not a citizen or national of the United
States. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3) (1970). Generally, the status of persons as aliens in the United
States is to be determined by the applicable laws of the United States. See United States
v. Gancy, 54 F. Supp. 755 (D. Minn.), aff'd., 149 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
767 (1945).
15. See note 18 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 139-182 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 82-93 infra.
18. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines residence as the place of general
abode, without regard to intent. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(33). (1970). The states have generally
defined nonresident aliens as those who are neither citizens of the United States nor residents
of their state. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 70 Cal. 153, 12 P. 121 (1886); In re Gill's Estate,
79 Iowa 296, 44 N.W. 553 (1890). For purposes of federal income taxation, a nonresident
alien individual is one whose residence is not within the United States and who is not a
citizen of the United States. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §871; Treas. Reg. §1.871-2(a). See also
Johansson v. United States, 376 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964); C.I.R. v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 925 (1950).
19. Foreign corporations are generally defined as those not incorporated in the forum.
Again, the context of the dispute usually defines the territorial limits. Because foreign
corporations have, for the most part, received more favorable treatment than foreign
individual investors, especially from the states, this note will emphasize the foreign individual investor and discuss the foreign corporate investor only when such a distinction
is relevant. See note 73 infra for the state statutes that regulate individual and corporate
F.D.I. in realty.
20.

1973 NAT'L J. REP. 1755.

21. See, e.g., FORTUNE, Sept. 1975, at 130, 144; Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1974, at 1,
col. 6, Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 2. Because real estate prices are so high in land-scarce
Japan, Japanese investors seem grateful to be able to purchase real property even at prices
that seem too high for United States investors. For example, 1974 property in downtown
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concern over F.D.I. in the United States was the recent fourfold increase in
the price of oil charged by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

22

With Arab oil producing nations' foreign currency reserves predicted to
reach $400 billion by 1980,23 it is apparent that these funds must be invested. The investment of this surplus capital in American real estate ranks
high on the "economic agenda" of the Arab countries34 Several reasons exist
for this high priority: (1) the political and economic stability of the United
States; (2) the low price of United States real estate compared with the price
of realty in other parts of the world; and (3) the considerable tax advantage
allowed foreign investment in United States realty.25 Thus, the Mideast OPEC
members have excess reserves they need to invest, and they appear to have a
direct investment preference for United States real estate. With such large
reserves, however, it would be economically and politically unwise for them
to invest solely in American real estate. Accordingly, a United States Treasury
Department study of Arab investment, issued in September 1974, estimated
that "only a few hundred million dollars may have gone into corporate
securities and real estate." 26
Los Angeles sold at $50 per square foot, but similar land in Tokyo sold for $900 per
square foot. Id. January 21, 1974, at 6, col. 2; see note 118 infra. Japanese land investment
has emphasized resort and leisure properties; for example, Japanese reportedly own onethird of the hotel rooms in Honolulu, Hawaii. When the price of oil quadrupled in 1974,
however, the Japanese, almost totally dependent on imported petroleum, not only shifted
their investment emphasis but also faced Japanese governmental regulation of investment
abroad. It appears that industrial properties and real estate, including natural resources,
have become more tempting to Japanese investors. See DUN'S REv. May 1974, at 58-59. The
Japanese Government, responding to a dwindling balance of payments surplus due to increased oil prices, stated that overseas investment in realty would require case-by-case
governmental approval. FORTUNE, Sept. 1975, at 135. The Japanese Government approved
investment in United States real property amounting to over $47 million between July 1971
and March 1973. Statement of Nelson A. Stitt, in Hearings on Foreign Investment in the
United States Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
Japanese corporations holding offshore reserves, however, are not subject to this regulation.
For example, in July 1974, a Japanese corporation paid over $100 million for three hotels
on Waikiki Beach, Hawaii; the sale was financed through the London eurodollar market.
FORTUNE, Sept. 1975, at 139.
22. On March 15, 1974, the posted price of crude oil stood at approximately $11.63
per barrel, a 400% increase from a year earlier. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
23. Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1974, at I, col. 6. Estimates of Arab reserves,
commonly known as petrodollars, have proliferated and divergent views have become the
rule. Compare Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1975, at 18, col. 1, with Wall Street Journal,
June 20, 1975, at 1,col. 5.
24. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1974, §111, at 5, col. 6. Investment in American realty follows
industrial development in their home country, defense programs, and some foreign aid. Id.
25. Id. Further reasons given for favoring investment in United States realty are:
the Mideastern countries' insistence on preservation of capital and their consideration of
real estate as a lasting asset, their desire for productive land, and their preference for
investments that attract publicity. Id. For a discussion of tax advantages of F.D.I. in realty,
see text accompanying notes 82-93 infra.
26. CONG. RESEARCH SrRV., Memo No. HG4501 For., October 18, 1974. A survey of
recent investment is helpful in determining the scope of Mideast F.D.I. in United States
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Japan and the countries of the Mideast are not the only actual or potential
foreign direct investors in United States property. In Florida, for instance,
the I.T.T. Community Development Corporation is spearheading a drive to
sell part of its 92,000 acre Palm Coast development to European investors. 27
Of particular interest is the recent purchase of $11 million worth of property
in the central Florida area by a French controlled chemical company for
phosphate mining; 28 phosphate is an essential ingredient in chemical fertilizers
Council, "Florida provides 75%, of
and, according to the Florida Phosphate
29

America's urgent need for phosphate."
Thus far, American reaction to F.D.I. in realty has been primarily local.
For example, in response to the Kuwait Investment Company's purchase of
Kiawah Island, South Carolina,30 several environmental groups have protested
the possible harm to turtle nesting grounds from resort development. 3' Like-

wise, the Hawaiian populace has strenuously objected to the Japanese practice
of buying resort properties, which are then made accessible exclusively to

participants in package tours from Japan.3 2 Congressional reaction has been

minimal so far, and only recently did Congress appropriate $3 million to
study the problem.3 3 There are, however, several bills pending in Congress

that propose to act affirmatively in this area.84

realty. The Kuwait Investment Company (owned half by the Kuwait government and
half by private Arab investors) purchased Kiawah Island, South Carolina, for $17A million,
planning to build a $100 million residential resort. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1975, at
38, col. I; Miami Herald, Sept. 13, 1974, at 5, col. I. Further purchases include a $25 million
industrial complex and Kuwaiti investment in a $100 million Atlanta hotel-commercial complex, with $10 million down and a mortgage for a one-half interest in the complex. Miami
Herald, Sept. 13, 1974, at 5, col. 1. Chase Manhattan Bank has handled about fifty deals for a
single Mideast client; types of purchases included income producing property, joint ventures
in industrial buildings, shopping centers, downtown office buildings, and sites for large
industrial parks for an aggregate investment: of over $100 million. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1974,
at 5, col. 1.
27. DuN's REv., May 1974, at 51, col. 1.
28. Wauchula (Fla.) Herald Advocate, April 24, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
29. Id., April 25, 1975, §3, at 1, col. 3. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
30. See note 26 supra.
31. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1975, at 38, col. 1. The Kuwaitis have spent approximately $20,000 annually to find a solution to the environmental impact of resort
development on these turtle nesting grounds. A collateral problem arose because Kuwaiti
purchases caused surrounding property values and taxes to soar, and the local population
could not afford the increased taxes. The Kuwaitis hired tax consultants to ameliorate this
result. Because the Kuwaitis have regarded this project as a showcase of Arab direct investment potential in the United States, the local reaction to this purchase and the Kuwaiti
response to the problems created by their investment may indicate the future course of
F.DI. in United States realty. Id.
32.
33.

1973 NAT'L J. RE'. 1758.
Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-478, §11, 88 Stat. 1450.

34. Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-N.J.) has sponsored a bill, the Foreign Investors Limitation Act, S. 425, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), that would: (1)authorize, though
not require, the President to prevent specific takeover attempts by foreign 'countries or
governments; (2) require disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks of publicly traded
corporations; (3) require foreign investors to notify the United- States Government, in
advance, of any purchase of 5% or more of the stock of a United States corporation; and (4)
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The Nixon Administration's pro-F.D.I. position was definitively stated
before a Senate Hearing,"' and President Ford has continued this position,
stating:
My Administration will oppose any new restriction on foreign investment in the United States, except where absolutely necessary on national
security grounds or to protect essential national interests.6
The book value of F.D.I. (25 percent foreign ownership) 37 in the United
States reached $17.7 billion at the end of 1973 (an increase of 24 percent
over the previous year), 38 compared with a total of $3.4 billion at the end of
1950.39 Yet overseas direct investments by American investors (defined as 10
percent or more of American ownership) totaled $107.3 billion at the conclusion of 1973 (up 14 percent over 1972),40 compared with a total of $11.8
billion.41 With this stake in the free flow of investment dollars, the Administration was apparently unwilling to restrict direct investment in the United
States and chance retaliation.
Executive and congressional reactions to F.D.I. appear to result, in part,
from an inadequacy of data on such investments in realty. Foreign investors
authorize the President to bar any such acquisition in the interest of national security,
foreign policy, or protection of the economy. 1975 NAT'L J. REP. 477.
The Foreign Investors Limitation Act proposes to prohibit any noncitizen from acquiring,
directly or indirectly, more than 5% of the voting securities (or 35% of the nonvoting
securities) of any issuer registered under §12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §781 (1970). Further, under one proposed bill, foreign direct investors would
have to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to their acquisition
of the securities of any registered American issuer. H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
The Energy and Defense Industry Production Act, although less restrictive than the above
legislation, would make it illegal for any noncitizen, or entity owned or controlled by a
noncitizen, to control any American issuer who is both registered under §12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 and engaged in an energy or defense industry. H.R. 12040, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
At least 14 bills have been introduced in the 93d and 94th Congresses to regulate or
monitor F.D.I. in the United States. Lewis, Economic Report- Welcome Mat Still Out for
Foreign Investors in the U.S., 1976 NAT'L J. REP. 31, 32. The House seems to be waiting
for Senate action and the results of the administration's Foreign Investment Study (scheduled
for presentation to Congress on April 29, 1976) before introducing comprehensive regulatory
legislation. Senator Stevenson (D-1ll.) has introduced the Anti-Boycott and Foreign Investment Bill, S. 953, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), which would prohibit discriminatory boycotting
and regulate F.D.I. The F.D.I. section basically incorporates Senator Williams' Foreign Investment Limitation Act. Id. at 41. See generally Note, An Evaluation of the Need for
Further Statutory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 147, 181-87 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Controls].
35. "While there have been bills introducing such restrictions [on foreign investment],
the Administration will, consistent with an overall policy of letting the free market allocate
the flow of investment, oppose this legislation unless absolutely necessary to protect our
national security." Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 8.
36. Lewis, supra note 34. at 33.
37. See note 3 supra.
38. 1974 NAT'L J. RaP. 1311.
39. House Hearings,supra note 21, at 270.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. See note 39 supra.
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are usually absentee landowners who typically engage a property management film to look after their investments; identifying land ownership is
difficult because it involves checking local land records at the county level;
furthermore, real estate investment is usually highly leveraged, and thus
4
minimal capital investment, easily disguised, may control the investment. 2
Another concern over F.D.I. in real estate is the fear of foreign control
over essential raw materials. The Chamber of Commerce of the United
States reported that "[ilt does appear from information available that the
adverse reaction to foreign investment in the United States comes about
when investment is directed toward 'non-productive' or the more speculative
43
assets such as real estate, timberland and other natural resource assets."
Moreover, Arab efforts to boycott American firms doing business with Israel
and financial institutions having Jewish connections certainly exacerbates
the issue of Mideast F.D.I. in the United States and undermines the Administration's pro-F.D.I. position. 44 Running throughout these various adverse
reactions to F.D.I. is also a thread of xenophobia-the fear of foreignersthat must be recognized and ameliorated.
DomEsTIc

METHODS OF REGULATING F.D.I. IN REAL ESTATE

One commentator on F.D.I. believes that restrictions on alien landholding
are the most significant legal impediment to all investment from abroad under
either federal or state law.45 Clearly, state restrictions on alien landholding are
potentially the foremost legal impediment to F.D.I. in United States realty
because the majority of United States land that would attract F.D.I. is
under private title, and the several states currently dominate the regulation
of private land ownership. 46 A brief review of the evolution of the state

42. Statement of Sidney L. Jones, in Senate Hearings, supra note 3,at 29. Leverage
is a method of financing whereby the investor puts in as little cash as possible and borrows
the remainder. The key to success is the differential between the interest rate on the
borrowed funds and the rate of return on the investment on disposition. Because of the
ability to borrow more money against realty than against other investments and because of
the tax advantages associated with realty, leverage is a common and highly desirable
method of real estate financing. See W. BEATON, REAL FSTATE INVESTMENT 126-27 (1971). For
example, leverage financing can cause an investment purchased with 10% cash and 90%
borrowed funds that sold for double its purchase price to realize a gain to the investor on
disposition equal to 14.25 times his initial investment. S. RouLAC, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION
DIGEST: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS

106, 108 tab. 12 (1972).

43. Statement of the United States Chamber of Commerce, in Senate Hearings, supra
note 3, at 143. See also text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
44. 1975 NAT'L. J. REP. 477.
45.

Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15, 39 (1962). This

statement seems rather broad today because most F.D.I. is in portfolio form, which puts
it beyond restrictions on alien land ownership. See CONG. RESEARCH SmEv., supra note 26.
46. A letter from the United States Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Ireland
stated that: "[j]egulation of the ownership of land under private title is a matter of State
rather than Federal jurisdiction. . . . Information of this character would have to be
obtained from the Attorney General or comparable officer of each State." 8 DIGEST OF
INT'L L. 487, 497 (1967).
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alien land laws is necessary to fully illuminate the current application of such
regulation47
State Alien Land Laws
In 1813 Justice Story outlined the common law disabilities concerning
48
alien land ownership in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee:
It is clear by the common law, that an alien can [take] lands by purchase,
though not by descent; or in other words . .. he may take by the act
of the party ....

[I]n the language of the ancient law, the alien has the

capacity to take, but not to hold lands, and they may be seized into the
hands of the sovereign. " 9
Thus, the alien may acquire real property by purchase and hold it against
all but the state, which can proceed against him by an action known as
"inquest of office" and thereby divest him of his property.50
Although the present system of state alien regulations is the result of almost 200 years of lawmaking, it appears to have developed within four distinct
phases: (1) common law disabilities during the colonial and Revolutionary
periods, (2) legislation substantially modifying the common law in the nineteenth century, (3) anti-alien legislation in the midwestern states during the
late nineteenth century, and (4) anti-Japanese legislation during the 1920's
and again during the Second World War. 51
During the colonial period and following independence, the states retained
52
the alien disabilities and modified the common law as seemed appropriate.
The post-Revolutionary tendency, however, was to remove these disabilities,
and by 1880, perhaps due to the stimulus of the fourteenth amendment, over
half of the states allowed aliens to hold land on equal terms with citizens. 5.3
This trend ended abruptly in the 1880's and

5 4

1890'S

when the Populist Party

movement of this period vigorously attacked large alien landholdings,
principally those of the immense British cattle companies. 55 It was also during
47. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 26-34.
48. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
49. Id. at 619.
50. See generally 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES t249, 0293; Sullivan, supra note
45, at 16. Sir Edward Coke revealed a xenophobic side of the common law in noting
several reasons for having alien disabilities: first, the secrets of the realm might be taken
and enjoyed by strangers; second, "[i]t should tend to the destruction of the realm";
Coke's third reason has a more current ring, "[that] [t]he revenues of the realm (the
sinews of war, & ornaments of peace) should be taken and enjoyed by strangers born."
Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 18b (1607). Also, Blackstone states that "[the common law)
seems to be intended by way of punishment for the aliens' presumption, in attempting to
" 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 03 72 .
acquire any landed property ..
51. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 26.
52. Ohio was the first state to give aliens equal treatment in landholding matters in
Ohio Laws 1804, at 123. Sullivan, supra note 45, at 29 n.63.
53. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 29.
54. Id. at 30.
55. See generally Note, Restrictions on Corporate Holdings of Real Estate, 21 N.Y.U.L.
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this period that precursors of many current alien restrictions such as the Alien
Land Bill5- were passed.5 7 As Populism died out, local resentment to alien
landholding waned. Nevertheless, this resentment of foreign presence was soon
rekindled by the great Japanese immigration during the 1900's. California,
bearing the brunt of this immigration, passed an alien land law in 1920.58
This statute stimulated another wave of anti-alien legislation; the target, this
time, was predominantly Japanese immigrants rather than all aliens. 59 In the
1928 decision of Porterfield v. Webb,6O the United States Supreme Court held
the California statute constitutional. The discrimination, the Court said, was
based on a reasonable classification, and thus there was no violation of the
due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 61 This
anti-alien sentiment diminished as the Great Depression approached, presumably because of the assimilation of the previous Japanese immigrants or
because of the exclusion of any more Japanese by the Immigration Act of
1924.62 As World War II revived anti-Japanese sentiment, the alien land laws
proved to be an effective vehicle for discrimination, and they were revived or
expanded.as
The postwar reaction, surprisingly, was not the historical slow progression
to equality. In 1948 the United States Supreme Court held that the escheat
of real property recorded in the name of a minor United States citizen but
paid for by his father, a Japanese citizen ineligible for American citizenship,
RV. 299 (1946) (discussion of state restrictions on corporate land holdings). See also L.
NoRDYKE, CATrLE EMPIRE (1949) (discussion of the large British cattle companies) (cited in
Sullivan, supra note 45, at 31 n.71); J. WPaFE & C. WARREN, THE MATADORS, 1879-1951 (1952).
56. Territorial Land Act of 1887, as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§1501 et seq. (1970). This act,
originally adopted by Congress to restrict land transfers to aliens in the territories of the
Great Plains and Rocky Mountains, lays down a complex pattern of restrictions on nonresident aliens.
57. During this period, eight states that had granted aliens equal treatment adopted
restrictions. They were Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
and Wisconsin. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 31 n.68.
58. Cal. Stat. 1921, lxxxiii.
59. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 33. This group of alien land laws did not discriminate
per se; they were based on a vagary of the Immigration Act, 39 Stat. 874, as amended, Act
of May 25, 1924, 43 Stat. 153, which, prior to 1952, precluded persons of the oriental race
from naturalization. The California statute and others patterned after it based alien land
ownership on the ability of an alien to be naturalized. These statutes provided that no alien
ineligible for citizenship could take or hold legal or equitable title to land. Land conveyed
to or for the use of such aliens in violation of the statute would escheat. To knowingly
transfer land or the right to the control, possession, or use of land to ineligible aliens was
a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. Id. This group of alien land laws is
clearly distinguishable from those laws following the Territorial Land Act of 1887, which
precluded persons from owning land who neither were citizens of the United States, nor
had declared their intent to become citizens. See note 54 supra. See also McGovney, The AntiJapaneseLand Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CAur. L. REv. 7 (1947).

60. 263 US. 225 (1923).
61. Id. at 233. For an analysis of this decision and its impact on current F.D.I. in

United States realty, see text accompanying notes 149-151 infra.
62. The Quota Law of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, amending the Immigration Act of 1917, 39

Stat. 874.
63. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 34.
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deprived the child of equal protection of the law.64 Moreover, in 1949 the
Oregon supreme court was the first state court to invalidate its alien land
law,6 5 which precluded all persons who were not eligible [or citizenship from
owning or leasing real property.-6 The court, finding no valid reason why
ineligible resident aliens should be precluded as a class from ownership of
interests in real property, held that the Oregon Alien Land Law was repugnant
to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 7 The death
knell of the California Alien Land Law tolled in 1952 when the California
supreme court, in a four to three decision, determined the act violative of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6" During that same
year, the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 195269 was amended to provide that "[t]he right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the
United States shall not be abridged because of race . . .., Consequently,
these alien land laws, founded on anti-Japanese sentiment, became moot.
State restriction of alien land ownership, however, has survived these
major challenges to its constitutionality.71 The most notable feature of any
current analysis of the states' alien land laws is the crazy quilt of legislation.
In a benchmark survey of state alien land laws prepared in 1962, Charles
Sullivan grouped these statutes into five classifications based on the degree
to which common law disabilities had been modified toward equal treatment: (1) full national treatment; (2) national treatment except for certain
numerically unimportant categories of aliens; (3) national treatment for
resident aliens only; (4) statutory restrictions on all aliens; and (5) retention
72
of some common law disabilities.
An update of this survey reveals that only a minor shift has occurred
since 1962 toward full national treatment of alien land ownership. 73 While
64. Oyama v. California, 3:12U.S. 633 (1948), rev'g sub non. People v. Oyama, 29 Cal.
2d 164, 173 P.2d 794 (1946).
65. Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
66. Ore. Laws §61-108 (1945).
67. 185 Ore. at 614 P.2d at 579.
68. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 617 (1952). The court stated that "[L]he
California Alien Land Law is obviously designed and administered as an instrument for
effectuating racial discrimination . . . . There is nothing to indicate that those alien
residents . . . as a class, might use the land for purposes injurious to public morals,
safety or welfare." Id. at 737-38, 242 P.2d at 630 (emphasis added).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et. seq. (1970).
70. Id. §1422.
71. See text accompanying notes 140-172 infra.
72. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 17.
73. Group I. In the following 25 jurisdictions, all aliens receive full national treatment:
Alabama, ALA. CoDE tit. 47, §1 (1958); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §50-301 (1971); California,
CAL. CIv. CODE §671 (West 1954); Canal Zone, C.Z. CODE tit. 4, §152 (1963); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §308 (1953); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §45-1501 (1973)
(But see Larkin v. Washington Loan & Trust, 31 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1929), holding this
statute inapplicable to realty within the District of Columbia); Florida, FLA. CONSr. art. 1,
§2, cf. FLA. STAT. §732.1101 (1975); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §55-103 (1957); Maine, ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §451 (1964); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184, §1 (1969);
Michigan, MIcn. Comu-. LAws ANN. §554.135 (1967); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §442.560
(Vernon Supp. 1974); Nevada, NEv. REV. STkT. §111.055 (1973); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
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ANN. §70-1-24 (1953); New York, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §10(2) (McKinney 1968); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §64-1 (1975); North Dakota, NJD. CENT. CODE §47-01-11 (1960);
Ohio, OHIO RFV. CODE ANN. §2105.16 (Page 1968); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§34-2-1 (1956); South Dakota, S.D. CoupinmE LAWS ANN. §43-2-9 (1967); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. §64-201 (1955); Texas, T x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 166a (1969); Vermont, VT.
CONsr. ch. II, §62 (But see State v. Boston, C. & M. R.R., 25 Vt. 433 (1853), holding that there
is no proper procedure for forfeiting property held by aliens, resident or nonresident, under
state law); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §64.16.005 (Supp. 1973); West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE ANN. §36-1-21 (1966).
Group II. The following three jurisdictions restrict the ownership of realty to aliens
eligible for citizenship. Because the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.
§1422 (1970), eliminated racial restrictions to eligibility, only three classes of aliens remain
ineligible: (1) those opposed to organized government or favoring totalitarian forms of
government; (2) deserters from the armed forces; and (3) persons relieved from service
in the armed forces due to alienage; Arizona, Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §33-1201 (1974);
Colorado, COLO. CONsr. art. II, §27; Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. 19, §21. The following three
jurisdictions restrict aliens' realty ownership to those aliens who are the subjects of
governments at peace with the United States: Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §79-301 (1973); Maryland, MD. ANN. REAL PROP. CODE §14-101 (1974); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §55-1 (1969).
Group III. The following nine jurisdictions allow only resident aliens to own property:
Alaska, the Alien Land Law, 48 U.S.C. §§1501 et seq. (1974) (in effect at statehood and
never repealed); see Sullivan, supra note 43, at 20 n.26; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§47-57 (1958); Hawaii, The Alien Land Law, 48 U.S.C. §§1501 et seq. (1970) (in effect at
statehood and never repealed); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. §567.1 (Supp. 1974); Mississippi
MIss. CODE ANN. §89-1-23 (1972); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §477:20 (1968);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §46:3-18 (Supp. 1974) (but see Caparell v. Goodbody, 132
N.J. Eq. 559, 29 A.2d 563 (1942), defining alien friends as subjects of a foreign state at peace
with the United States. But see also an amendment to §46:3-18 in 1943, N.J. Laws 1943, ch.
145, §1, at 395, wherein friendly alien was defined to exclude nonresident aliens); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§121-22 (1971); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. §710.02 (Spec.
Pamphlet 1975) (limits nonresident alien ownership to a maximum of 640 acres).
Group IV. The following seven jurisdictions impose statutory limitations on resident
and nonresident aliens: Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, §§1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (limits
aliens' right to hold realty to six years or until alien reaches majority); Indiana, IND. ANN.
STAT. CODE §§32-1-8-1, -2 (Burns 1973) (limits aliens' right to hold realty in excess of
320 acres to five years from date of acquisition); Kentucky, Ki. REv. STAT. ANN. §381.300
(Baldwin 1969) (limits aliens' right to hold realty to eight years after acquisition); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §500.22 (Supp. 1974) (limits aliens' right to hold realty in excess of
90,000 square feet); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§76-402 et seq. (1971) (limits aliens' right
to hold realty in excess of five years unless the property is within the corporate limits
of a village or city, or within three miles of the corporate limits of a village or city, or
necessary for the operation of certain manufacturing, industrial, or petroleum establishments); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §32 (1965) (limits aliens' right to hold realty
in excess of 5,000 acres or net annual income of $20,000); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. §57-103 (1962) (limits aliens' right to hold realty in excess of 500,000 acres).
Group V. The following five jurisdictions have apparently allowed the common law to
prevail: Kansas, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §34-151 (1959),
precludes nonresident aliens, ineligible for citizenship, from holding real property unless
the ineligible alien's country allows a reciprocal right of ownership. Consequently, nonresident aliens eligible for citizenship are governed by the common law and take a defeasible title.
While a survey of state restrictions on alien ownership is useful in discerning trends
in the law and in establishing the law's current position, the investigator should be
aware that opposition to alien ownership will not disappear merely because a state does
not actively preclude foreign investment in realty. For example, the hostility to the Kuwaiti
purchase of Kiawah Island, South Carolina, was manifested by environmental and tax com-
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several states have relaxed or repealed their laws, it is apparent that others
have used wide latitude acting in this area. There is little or no continuity
in the various statutes and little apparent rationale for the diverse restrictions.74 Moreover, it is clear that in many cases the causes for alien restriction
have been cyclical, topical reactions and that such reactions when addressed
to resident aliens have been strongly attacked on equal protection grounds. 75
Because some legislative restrictions on alien land ownership have been
invalidated as improperly motivated does not necessarily imply that all
response is unconstitutional or undesirable; however, divergent actions by
the several states at different intensities do generate overwhelming confusion
to foreign direct investors, legislators, and the executive branch. As a result,
the inertia of these separate laws has inhibited the development of a national
policy and a consistent foreign relations position in the area of F.D.I. in
realty.

6

FederalRegulation
Although the federal government has not acted in the area of privately
titled real estate per se, several federal activities have a great effect on F.D.I.
in realty. The treaty power, for example, affects F.D.I. because a treaty will
control whenever it comes into conflict with state law. 77 The standard vehicle
for regulating foreign investment between nations is the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation (F.C.N. treaties). The United States has entered
into 130 treaties of this type since 1778.78
The touchstone of an F.C.N. treaty is reciprocity. The basic approach is
to guarantee that, with respect to a certain activity, the nationals of each
signator will receive either equal national treatment or the treatment accorded
plaints. See note 31 supra. Of course, that a state does not preclude alien ownership of realty
does not imply that it cannot. The maximum regulation might be established by common
law disabilities as evidenced in Group V, supra, or by state constitution. Florida, for
example, has no statute that directly addresses the right of a nonresident to purchase
realty. The Florida constitution, however, provides that: "All natural persons . . . have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to . . . acquire, possess, and protect property;
except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition, and possession of real property by
aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law." FLA. CONST. art. 1, §2.
Thus, the maximum regulation in Florida for aliens ineligible for citizenship would be a move
to Group II, supra.
74. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. CODE §§32-1-8-1, -2 (Bums 1973) (limiting alien ownership
to 320 acres); MINN. STAT. ANN. §500.22 (Supp. 1974) (limiting alien ownership to 90,000
square feet); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 §§28, 32 (1965) (limiting alien ownership to 5,000 acres
or a net annual income of S20,000).
75. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); note 68 supra.
76. Although the conclusion drawn in the 1962 survey that the circumstances surrounding
alien real property regulation were no longer meaningful has not necessarily been proven,
the view of alien land laws as anachronistic vehicles in reacting to such circumstances
appears correct. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 34.
77. E.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). Any doubt that state policies
concerning aliens must yield to a valid exercise of the treaty power was put to rest in
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
78. Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 68.
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a most favored nation79 A problem arises, however, in negotiating a treaty's
provisions in the F.D.I. area because of the diversity in state laws. The federal
government has been hesitant to abrogate the states' laws, yet it desires to
negotiate treaties that will allow United States investment to expand overseas.
The solution has been that, in the more recent treaties, "the United States
has not accorded nationals of foreign states the privilege of acquiring lands
within American territory if such acquisition is opposed by local state law."s 0
This "solution" has forced foreign signatories to apply a treatment to American
F.D.I analogous to that which the domicile state of the American investor
would apply to the signatory's F.D.I.81
Another significant federal effect over F.D.I. in United States real estate
lies in the area of federal income taxation. The present structure for taxing
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations has its genesis in the Foreign Investor's Tax Act of 196682 passed, in part, to promote F.D.I. in the United
States.8 3 One of the most notable features of this Act was to create the concept
of "effectively connected with a United States trade or business." This
principle classified F.D.I. as business oriented (investment found effectively
connected) or investment oriented (investment determined not effectively
connected),84 Thus F.D.I. income (fixed or determinable, annual or periodic
income), whether corporate or individual, not effectively connected with
United States trade or business, is taxed at a flat rate of 30 percent unless a
lower treaty rate applies. 85 This tax is imposed on gross income from United
79. National treatment results from a bilateral agreement to treat investors of the
signatory countries as domestic investors. Most favored nation treatment gives to the foreign
investor the most favorable treatment that is extended by the signatory to any other
foreign country; this treatment may be less favorable than national treatment. See Senate
Hearings,supra note 8, at 68. For example, the F.C.N. Treaty of March 27, 1956, with the
Netherlands, art. VII, 11, gives national treatment to certain classes of investment activity;
12 excepts the exploitation of land and other natural resources from national treatment;
f14,
however, states that even in those areas where national treatment is not required, the
countries will still extend most favored national treatment. Id. at 69.
80. 8 DGEsrs INT'L L. 487 (1967).
81. See, e.g., Treaty with Italy on commerce and navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255.
Article VII,
provides that Italian investors are dependent on the laws and regulations
in force within the American state or territory wherein the property is situated. This has
been interpreted to mean that Italy would have the right to deny national treatment to
United States investors if their domicile state denied national treatment to Italian investors.
8 DIGEST INT'L L. 489. In the Convention of Establishment with France, Nov. 25, 1959, 11
U.S.T. 2398, §§10, 11 of a protocol provide that France may apply treatment to American
investors analogous to that with which the Americans' state of domicile will apply to
French investors. Id. at 2422.
82. INT.R v. CoDE oF 1954, §§871 et seq.
83. S. REP. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., in 1966 U.S. CONG. g-AD. NEws 4446,
4454. See House Hearings,supra note 21, at 241. See generally Farrell, Strategies for Foreign
Corporations in the U.S. Realty Market, 3 REAL EST. Ray. Winter 1974, at 28, 28-37.
Rosignoli g:Landy, Tax Planningfor Non-Resident Alien Investors in U.S. Income-Producing
Properties, 3 THE TAx ADvisoR 551-57 (1972) (discussion of other methods of F.D.I. in
United States realty, such as partnerships, trusts, and offshore funds).
84. See B. Brramn & J. Eus-ncE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLmRS

85.

17.02 at 17-13 (3d ed. 1971).

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §871(a)(1) (individual taxpayers), §881(a)(1) (corporations).
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States sources, and no business deductions are alloweds6 Income derived
from an investment deemed effectively connected with American trade or
business, however, will be taxed at the appropriate domestic, graduated
corporate or individual rates on taxable income (recognizing appropriate
deductions).

87

The treatment of recognized capital gains from F.D.I. is more complicated,
depending not only on whether gain is "effectively connected" but also on
whether the F.D.I. is in corporate or individual form. If effectively connected
with United States trade or business, capital gains are taxable to both individual and corporate taxpayers at domestic graduated rates.88 If their gain
is not effectively connected, individual foreign direct investors present in the
United States for 183 days or more will be taxed at a flat rate of 30 percent
on recognized capital gain. 9 If the investment is not effectively connected with
United States trade or business, however, capital gains of foreign direct
corporate investors and individual investors not present in the United States
for 183 days or more are tax free.9°
If income derived from F.D.I. in United States realty is effectively connected, thus taxable at progressive rates with allowable deductions, then gain
recognized on the disposition of this realty should also be effectively connected
and subject to taxation. Conversely, if the attendant income is not effectively
connected and the taxpayer is not an individual present in the United States
for 183 days or more, recognized gain on this disposition should be tax free.
A feature more important to F.D.I. in American realty is that both corporate
and individual foreign direct investors may elect to have income and capital
gains derived from real property investment determined not effectively
connected with United States trade or business treated as if it were from
effectively connected realty. 91 The taxpayer can choose the treatment that will
give him the greatest benefit, which in some cases will be no taxation at all.92
86.

Id. For individuals, three deductions exist regardless of their connection: (1) casualty

or loss deductions, id. §873(b)(1) (see also §165(c)(3)); (2) deductions for charitable
contributions, id. §170; and (3) one personal exemption, id. §§151, 142(b)(1).
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§871(b), 882(a). The terms "resident-nonresident" and
"effectively connected" are terms of art. See generally Alexander, U.S. Taxation of Real
Estate Owned by Non-Resident Aliens and Foreign Corporations, 21 U. MIAMI L. REy.

651 (1967); Crockett & Ashwell, Federal Taxation of Non-Resident Aliens and Foreign
Corporations,13 DUQUESNE L. REV. 37 (1974); Feinschreiber & Feinschreiber, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: The Federal Tax Considerations, 3 REAL EsT. L.J. 144 (1974), for
a discussion of these terms and this area of taxation.
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§871(b), 882(a).
89. Id. §871(a)(2).

90. INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §§871(a)(2), (b)(2); see Feinschreiber & Feinschreiber, supra

note 82, at 146.
91. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§871(d), 882(d).
92. The election, once made, is generally revokable only by consent of the Commissioner,
although tax treaties may provide a year by year election. Because gain from the sale
of realty may be tax free if no election is taken, there is a significant advantage to being
able to terminate the election. There also may be a significant advantage in electing to
treat income from realty investment as effectively connected, thus taxable on a net income
base, and then terminating the election for a tax-free capital gain on the realty's sale. A clear
example of such an advantage to foreign direct investors is found in art. V and art. X of the
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This election provision should promote F.D.I. in real property and natural
resources. 93
OTHER COUNTRIES' METHODS OF REGULATING

F.D.I.

A thread which appears to run throughout national policies in F.D.I. is
the notion of reciprocity or, perhaps, the fear of foreign retaliation." This
concept is notably absent in the states' legislation in this area. 95 Consequently,
in order to evaluate the concept of reciprocity, a review of several other
countries' methods of regulating F.D.I. in real estate is appropriate.
Canada
In the twentieth century, foreign capital has played a greater role in the
Canadian economy than it has in the economy of any other advanced nation.
Over the past decade, however, there have been noticeable changes in public
and official attitudes toward this high level of foreign ownership.96 In 1972 the
Canadian government published an exhaustive study, commonly known as the
Grey Report,97 concerning the role of foreign investment in the Canadian
economy. In response to this study, the Canadian government passed the
Foreign Investment Review Act in 197398 to review each proposed foreign
Netherlands Antilles-United States income tax treaty. For any taxable year these provisions
allow an election to treat income and gain as "effectively connected" and thus taxable on
a net income base. See Langer, Analysis of the Netherlands Antilles-U.S. Income Tax Treaty
in FOREIGN TAx HAVENS 3D 57, 65 (1974). A case study prepared for the Practicing Law
Institute cogently demonstrates how this treaty may be used by foreign direct investors
to purchase United States realty at a minimal tax cost. Langer, Case Study: How Nonresident
Aliens Use Netherlands Antilles Companies to Buy U.S. Real Estate in FOREIGN TAX
HAVENS 3D 103 (1973). See also Feinschreiber & Feinschreiber supra note 87, at 150. It has
further been noted that "in almost every conceivable case, it will be advantageous to
form a foreign corporation to make the investment in United States real property." Ross,
United States Taxation of Aliens and Foreign Corporations: The Foreign Investors Tax
Act and Related Developments, 22 TAx L. REV. 279, 318 (1967).
93. At least one commentator has noted that such promotion of F.D.I. might not be
wise. "While such a policy might be termed 'neo-isolationism,' when viewed in light
of the current fervor over growing foreign control over natural resources and energy reserves
[encouragement of domestic investment] could well merit consideration." Crockett & Ashwell,
supra note 87, at 40. It is interesting to note that INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §892, exempts
from taxation the income of foreign governments received from investments from any
source in the United States. As OPEC monetary reserves grow, this Code provision will
become increasingly significant to these foreign direct investors.
94. See text following note 41 supra.
95. See note 73 supra for the states' legislation.
96. In 1964, 46% of the people felt that Canada had enough United States capital,
while 33% wanted more. By 1972, 67% thought Canada had enough, while only 22%
welcomed more United States investment. Fayerweather, Nationalism or Continentalism?
Canada Reacts to U.S. Investment, CHALLENGE, (SEPT-Ocr. 1973) (cited in Crain, The
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and Mexico,
CONG. Rasmacna SmEv. Multilith No. 74-52 E. (1974), at 7).
97. THE GOvERNaiuENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIREar INVEsTMENT IN CANADA (1972).
98. Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973, 21-22 Eliz. II, c. 46 (Can.).
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equity investment in Canada in order to determine whether the investment is
consonant with Canada's long-run economic plans 9
The most significant change in the Canadian view of F.D.I. has come
at the provincial level, where there has been a developing concern over the
foreign ownership of land. The response to foreign ownership has taken
the form of provincial laws that place severe restrictions on the transfer of
land to foreigners. Several examples are illustrative. In Ontario Province, an
alien purchasing vacation property is subject to a heavy land transfer tax
amounting to 20 percent of the purchase price, and anyone selling to a
foreigner is taxed up to 50 percent of his profit. 100 Prince Edward Island
requires government approval for sales to aliens of tracts larger than ten acres
or of more than 330 feet of shore front. 0 1 Sasketchewan prohibits the sale of
realty valued at more than $15,000 to any nonresidents of the province. 10Nova Scotia has taken the most drastic action by expropriating American
owned property. Moreover, this province has compiled a list of land parcels
that it wishes to reacquire, either by negotiated settlements or by expropriation. 10'
There are several apparent reasons for provincial reaction to F.D.I. in
Canadian realty. Feelings of nationalism lead to the belief that local
Canadians, not foreigners, should own Canadian land. An Ontario study
revealed that foreign ownership in parts of the Great Lakes region is as high
as 90 percent. 0 4 In some areas of Nova Scotia, foreigners own over half of
the available vacation land.105 Another reason is that foreign money is driving
land prices out of the reach of Canadians.0° Although such legislation restricting nonresident direct investment in Canadian realty is being tested in
the Canadian courts, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the restriction
limiting aliens' purchases by holding that Prince Edward Island's regulation
of all landowners who are aliens to the Province (both Canadian and nonCanadian citizens) did not invade the exclusive authority of Parliament
and only conferred on aliens to Canada the same rights and restrictions as
all Canadian citizens concerning the legitimate regulation of property ownership in Prince Edward Island Province. 07 Notably, there is no Canadian
01
federal law in this area.
99. See Comment, Foreign Investment, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725 (1974). See also
Lamont, Emerging Neo-Mercantilism in Canadian Policy Toward State Enterprises and
Foreign Direct Investment, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121 (1974); Statutory Controls, supra
note 34, at 166-67.
100. See Lamont, supra note 99, at 123; MacIntosh, Foreign Investment in Canada Recent Trends, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN 1974 113-14 (V. Cameron ed. 1975); Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1974, at 28,

col. 1.
101. See note 100 supra.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1974, at 28, col. 2.
105. Id.
106. Id
107. Morgan v. Attorney-General, 42 D.L.R.3d 603 (U.E.I. Sup. Ct. 1973), afj'd, 55
D.L.R.3d 527 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1975); see Toronto Star, Feb. 22, 1975, at B6, col. 1.
108. See Toronto Star, note 107 supra. It is ironic that 1.5 million Canadians own
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The similarity between the Canadian experience and current development
in the United States is striking. Both countries are politically stable, consist
of large land masses, and have greatly benefited from foreign direct investments in the past. Both have a state-federal system of government and derive
their land laws from the common law. There is, however, one crucial
difference: Canada has a large amount of F.D.I. occurring within Canada
compared to her direct investment abroad. 0 9 The United States position is
the reverse - greater investment abroad rather than foreign investment at
home.'- Thus, Canada has a much smaller exposure to retaliatory restrictions
on F.D.I. from countries affected by her restrictions than has the United States.
Japan
For most of the post-World War II era, Japanese policy on foreign investment was severely restrictive."' Since 1967, however, Japan has been liberalizing her regulation of F.D.I. The liberalization involved several important
policy decisions: (1) to vary the degree of liberalization among industries;
(2) to discriminate according to the degree of foreign ownership; and (3) to
distinguish between the establishment of new firms and the acquisition of
existing firms." 2 These policies were effected primarily by the creation and
regulation of three groups of industries: Category I -foreign investment was
permitted, without individual screening, if foreigners acquired no more than
50 percent ownership; Category II-investment was open to 100 percent
foreign ownership; unliberalized investment in industries not assigned to
either category, as well as investment exceeding 50 percent in Category I
industries, still required individual validation." 3 This liberalization consisted of movements of industries into the more unrestricted categories.
Four rounds of liberalization were planned in 1967 to be completed within
five years." 4 The fourth round was completed in 1971, one year ahead of
1 15
schedule.
In 1971 the real estate industry moved into Category .'16 A fifth
round of liberalization was initiated in 1973 moving real estate to Category 11
and allowing 100 percent foreign ownership. This phase-over to complete
property in Florida and that Ontario Premier William Davis has a winter home in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1974, at 28, col. 3.
109. See, e.g., Dunn, Canada and Its Economic Discontents, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Oct.
1973, at 119-40; Gibson, Canada's Declaration of Less Independence, 51 HARv. Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1973, at 69-79.
110. See text accompanying note 38-40 supra.
111. See generally Furuhashi, New Policy Toward Foreign Investment Issues in the
Japanese Capital Liberalization, MICH. ST. UNIv. Bus. Topics, Spring 1972, at 2.
112. Crain, supra note 96, at 44.

113. Id. at45.
114. See generally Statutory Controls, supra note 34, at 163-65.
115. See generally CUluzrREr LEGAL AspIcrs OF DOING BUSINESS IN

THE FAR EAsr (R.
Allison ed. 1972); Furuhashi, Foreign Capital in Japan, COL. J. WORLD Bus., Mar.-Apr. 1972,
at 50; Furushashi, supra note 111; King, Restrictions on U.S. Investment, 11 SAN DIEGO L.

Rv. 27, 56-57 (1973); Statutory Controls, supra note 34; at 163-65.
116. See note 114 supra.
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ownership is to be completed by 1976.117 It must be noted, however, that
Japan's realty prices are among the highest in the world.118 Japan may have
been motivated to liberalize its regulations in this comparatively nonlucrative
investment area in order to protect from retaliation its substantial investments in real estate abroad.119
Latin America
Under Mexico's recently enacted Foreign Investment Law of 1973,120 all
real property owned by foreigners in Mexico must be registered with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 1 These investors must also make an agreement

with the Mexican government pursuant to the Calvo Clause, which precludes the foreign investor from involving his country's official assistance in
Mexican land disputes.122 Further, although the Mexican constitution prohibits foreign ownership of land within a "prohibited zone,"' 123 the new act
will allow foreigners to become beneficiaries of a land trust, with a trust
duration of thirty years. Additionally, although transient aliens are precluded
from acquiring real estate, resident and nonresident aliens may invest in land
trusts and even acquire direct ownership of Mexican land, if not located
1 24
within the "prohibited zone."
Foreign equity investment in Mexican business enterprises owning legal
title to realty outside the "prohibited zone" is allowed, provided such participation does not exceed 49 percent foreign ownership. Although such an investment precludes these businesses from owning property in the "prohibited
zone," they may acquire beneficial interests in a land trust. 125 Again, the investment must be registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and must
include a Calvo Clause agreement.
Perhaps the most interesting reaction to F.D.I. has been the creation of
117. See House Hearings,supra note 21, at 449; N.Y. Times, April 28,
4; Wall Street Journal, Apr. 26, 1973, at 4, col. I.
118. 25 Tokyo Municipal News, Mar. 1975, no. 2, at 1200. A Japanese
chase a piece of real estate, would have to spend all the wages he
six years and 149 days. An American worker would need only 45 days wages;
worker would need 174 days wages. Id. See note 21 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 21 supra.

1973, at 44, col.
worker, to purhad earned in
a West German

120. LAW FOR THE PROMOTION OF MEXICAN INVESTMENT AND TO REGULATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT, DIARO OFFICIAL, Mar. 9, 1973.

121. Id. art. 17.
122. See note 120 supra. The Calvo Clause requires that the foreign investor agree
not to invoke official assistance from his country in any questions arising from his ownership
of land in Mexico. See generally Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4
INT'L LAW.

611 (1970).

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF MExIcO, art. 27, %1.The prohibited
zone is all land within 100 kilometers of Mexican land borders and within 50 kilometers of

123.

Mexican seacoasts. Id.
124. See Meek, Land Transfer and Finance in Mexico, 4

DENVER J. OF L. & POL. 25, 29
(1974). See also Chayet & Sutton, Mexican Real Estate Transactions by Foreigners, 4 DENvER
J. OF L. & POL. 15 (1974); King, supra note 115, at 49-53; Vilaplana, The Forbidden Zones
in Mexico, 10 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 47 (1973).
125. See Meek, supra note 124, at 27.
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the Andean Common Market and the adoption of the Andean Investment
28
7
and foreign. 129
Code.126 The Code classifies enterprises as national, 12 mixed,
The heart of the Code is its scheme of divestment or transformation of
foreign enterprises. All foreign firms established after July 1, 1971, must divest
themselves of sufficient equity so that, eventually, all firms enjoying the
benefits of trade liberalization will be held by national investors. 30 In essence,
all firms wishing to participate in tariff reductions must transform themselves
into national or mixed enterprises. The Code establishes procedures for
effectuating this "fade-out" from foreign to mixed or national firms. 1 Bolivia
and Ecuador, the most underdeveloped of the six member nations, are allowed
a longer period to "fade-out" foreign control than are Chile, Colombia, Peru,
and Venezuela."32 Although the new control may be governmental rather than
private, divestment insures local control over F.D.I. for each member of the
Andean group. It further provides a systematized procedure for local investors
to "phase-into" control of their own economy." 33

Saudi Arabia
Saudi regulation generally prohibits the ownership of realty by non-Saudis,
but it does grant specific exceptions. A non-Saudi, for instance, will not be
allowed to purchase real estate located within the limits of the Holy Mosques
of Mecca and Medina.3 4 The non-Saudi, however, may acquire the right of
ownership with regard to arable land, if the acquisition is approved by
the Ministers of Agriculture and Interior.135 Foreign enterprises permitted to
operate in Saudi Arabia may own realty necessary to their activity, provided
a license is obtained from the Minister of Commerce and Industry."6 Lying
beyond these proscriptions, a non-Saudi direct investor, on Royal approval
126. Andean Foreign Investment Code, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 126 (1972). The Andean
Common Market includes Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
127. Id. art. I. A national enterprise is one more than 80% owned or controlled by
national investors. A national investor is defined to include private citizen nationals, nonprofit legal persons (also nationals), and foreign nationals who have completed one year
of residence and have promised not to remove or transfer profits out of the country.
128. Id. A mixed enterprise is one 51 to 80% owned or controlled by national investors.
A firm may be classified as mixed despite more than 50% foreign ownership, however, if:
(a) the state is the minority owner; and (b) the state, despite minority ownership, has a
determining voice in the management of the enterprise. Id. art. 56.
129. Id. art. 1. A foreign enterprise is one in which a foreign national has majority
ownership and the minority ownership is not in the state. See generally Valdez, The
Andean Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. Ir'rL L. & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1972).
130. Valdez, supranote 129, at 9.
131. Andean Foreign Investment Code, 11 INT'LrLEGAL MAT. 126, arts. 3(c), 28-31.
132. Id. See also Lisocki, The Andean Investment Code, 49 NoTRE DAME LAW. 317, 321
(1973).
133. See generally King, supra note 111, at 53-54; Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Foreign Direct Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L 763 (1972); House Hearings, supra note 21, at 408-18.

134. Royal Decree No. m/22 of 12/7/1390 (Sept. 13, 1970),
135. Id. 13(b).

l.

136. Id. %3(c).
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may own real
and with a recommendation from the Minister of the Interior,
137
'
purposes.
investment
for
or
dwelling
private
estate for his
It is apparent from an analysis of other countries' F.D.I. proscriptions
that strict regulation of F.D.I. is becoming increasingly prevalent around
the world. This is in no small part a reaction to the tremendous growth of
United States based multinational enterprises involved in overseas direct
investment. 1 38 Therefore, the time has arrived for the United States to

recognize the reciprocal nature of transnational investment and to consider
the effects of increased United States regulation on F.D.I., whether at state
or federal level, on international foreign investment equilibrium.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING
'UNITED STATES REAL ESTATE

F.D.I.

IN

The need for United States regulation (but not necessarily proscription)
of F.D.I. is clear in light of the recent increase in F.D.I. in United States
realty as well as the global tendency for other countries to regulate foreign
property ownership. The threshold issue, however, is not the need for regulation but whether the United States Constitution allows regulation of nonresident alien investors. Further, assuming that such investment can be
regulated, are the states preempted from such regulation by the foreign
affairs powers exclusively given to the federal government?

39

The Due Processand Equal Protection Challenge
The most prevalent constitutional challenges to regulation of F.D.I. in
realty have been premised on the due process and equal protection clauses of
40
the fourteenth amendment. In Shames v. Nebraska,1 a federal district court
noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has never indicated in unequivocal terms
'
whether a State is required to give due process to nonresident aliens. ",Holding that a Nebraska statute regulating a nonresident alien's right to
inherit real property' 42 did not violate due process, the district court relied
137. Id. 3(d).
138. See, e.g., Gabriel, MNC's in The Third World: Is Conflict Unavoidable?, 50 Hnav.
Bus. REy., July-Aug. 1972, at 93; New Era for the Multinationals, Bus. WEEK, July 6, 1974,
at 93.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. This section grants to Congress certain powers with respect
to the conduct of foreign affairs. Article II, §2 grants such powers to the President. Further,
article I, §10 prohibits the states from entering into any agreement or compact with a foreign
power. These provisions, construed together, have been interpreted to mean that the
power over foreign affairs is an exclusive federal power. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 223 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). See generally Note,
Alien InheritanceStatutes: An Examination of the Constitutionality of State Laws Restricting
the Rights of Non-Resident Aliens to Inherit from American Decedents, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV.
597 (1974).
140. 323 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Neb.), aff'd., 408 U.S. 901 (1971).
141. Id. at 1333.
142. The rights of nonresident aliens to take by inheritance from United States citizens
has been extensively litigated and commented on. See, e.g., note 168 infra; note 140 supra;
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heavily on a series of Supreme Court decisions that upheld the validity of
alien land laws.
In Terrace v. Thompson,143 the Supreme Court upheld the Washington
alien land law,1 44 noting that:
[E]ach state in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary,
has power to deny to aliens the right to hold land within its borders....
State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens, withholding
from them the right to own land, cannot be said to be capricious or to
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property, or to
transgress the due process clause.'" 5
Terrace further expressly upheld the alien land law against an equal protection
challenge, noting that the only aliens excluded from ownership of land were
those Congress found ineligible for citizenship (primarily Japanese) 14 and
47
those who had failed to declare their intent to become United States citizens.
The Court reasoned that the indusion of good faith declarants in the same
class with citizens did not unjustly discriminate against aliens who were ineligible or who failed to declare their intention to become citizens. The
Court further held that "the state act is not repugnant to the equal protection
clause and does not contravene the fourteenth amendment."'' 48 In a line of
cases argued the same day,' 49 the Court also upheld the California alien land
law,' 50 citing Terrace as controlling and noting that the only distinguishing
point between the two statutes was that the California statute did not preclude
eligible aliens from purchasing realty because they had failed to declare their
5
intent to become citizens.' 1
It is of crucial importance to a foreign direct investor whether he will be
protected by the due process or equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The due process clause provides that "[n]o state shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."152
Consequently, the threshold due process issue becomes a question of whether
a nonresident is a "person" under the fourteenth amendment.153 The Supreme
Court's vacillation on this threshold applicability of due process protection
Note, supra note 139; Note, Non-Resident Alien Inheritance of Nebraska Land: 1854-1971,
4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 304 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Inheritance of Nebraska Land].
143. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
144. Id. at 213 n.2.
145. Id. at 217.
146. See note 73 supra, Group II.
147. 263 US. at 219-20.
148. Id. at 222.
149. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); accord, Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923);
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 US. 313 (1923).
150. See Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 319 n.l.
151. See Porterfield v. Webb, 362 US. 225, 233.
152. U.S. CONsr. art. XIV, §I (emphasis added).
153. Constitutional challenges on due process and equal protection grounds applicable
to the states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment apply as well to federal action either
expressed or implied by the fifth amendment due process clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347

U.S. 497 (1954).
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to nonresident aliens continues to trouble courts faced with this issue. T The
Court in Shames avoided this troublesome area by holding that the Nebraska
statute, 155 which provided that under certain circumstances property inherited
by a nonresident alien would escheat to the state, did not violate the due
process clause. 156 Thus, the Court did not need to decide "whether or not a
State must accord nonresident aliens due process.' 15 7 The Shames Court
reasoned that Ten-ace was still the controlling precedent on the substantive
merits of a due process challenge to nonresident alien regulation, stating:
154. See text accompanying note 141 supra. The following are the principle cases
marshalled in support of extending due process to nonresident aliens. Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). The Court, faced with an issue of statutory
interpretation in a contract dispute arising before the United States Court of Claims, stated
that "petitioner was an alien friend, and as such was entitled to protection of the fifth
amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 489. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942). The Court, faced with claims on the State of New York by foreign creditors concerning the distribution of assets of a Russian insurance corporation nationalized by the
Soviet Union, stated that "aliens as weli as citizens are entitled to the protection of the
fifth amendment." Id. at 228. Yet the Court allowed New York to grant priority to local
creditors. Id. Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
898 (1966). The court cogently presented the argument, noting that "the due process
clause speaks in terms not of taking but of deprivation," and held that an argument that
"'[t]he Constitution of the United States confers no rights on non-resident aliens' is so
patently erroneous in a case involving property in the United States that we are surprised
it was made." Id. at 111.
The authorities that seem contrary to the vesting of the constitutional rights in nonresident aliens are: Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U.S. 580 (1915). The Court dismissed
an appeal alleging that the Nebraska alien land law was repugnant to the fourteenth
amendment and stated that "we think also [that the allegation] is too frivolous to afford
a basis for jurisdiction." Id. at 583. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). In determining
the constitutionality of a deportation proceeding, the Court said: "[A]n alien brings with
him no constitutional rights . . . . The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien
seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters
and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include . . . the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment." id. at 161 (concurring opinion). Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950). Again faced with determining the constitutional propriety of exclusion, the
Court stated: "But, in extending Constitutional protection beyond the citizenry, the Court
has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary the power to act." Id. at 771. Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell,
457 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1972). In determining whether commuter aliens are entitled to full
constitutional protection when on jobs within the United States, the court stated that
"the resident alien has a constitutionally protected presence. Any person within the
United States, citizen or alien, resident or non-resident, is protected by the guarantees
of the Constitution." Id. at 749. This line of cases, Bridges, Johnson, and Mitchell, seems
to develop a territoriality theory of constitutional rights. Such a theory would somewhat
ameliorate the views expressed by the dissent in Shames, 323 F. Supp. at 1341, and the
court in Sardino, 361 F.2d at Ill, that the taking of a nonresident alien's property without
compensation would be repugnant to due process. By making an appearance, the foreign
direct investor might recover his investment even if the restrictive law was held valid. For
an analysis of the cases, supra, in the context of an inheritance statute, see Inheritance of
Nebraska Land, supra note 142, at 313-35.
155. 323 F. Supp. at 1324 nu. 5-7.
156. Id. at 1335.
157. Id. at 1333.
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[A] state's absolute bar of ownership of land by nonresident aliens has
been held by the Supreme Court to be within the valid exercise of
that state's police power, and58not violative of due process of law under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's afflirmance of Shames tends to strengthen that conclusion.
Thus, unless the Supreme Court speaks in more definitive terms on the issue
of nonresident aliens' right to due process with respect to realty ownership,
their F.D.I. in United States realty appears to have no such protection.
The equal protection clause states that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction,the equal protection of the laws."'' 59 Thus, from
the view of a foreign direct investor, the qualifications for equal protection
coverage are stricter than for due process; not only must the nonresident
alien be a person recognizable by- law, but he must also be within the
jurisdiction of a state. The Terrace line of cases dismissed the equal protection argument summarily 60 and the current trend applies equal protection
to aliens in a manner at least implying a resident-nonresident alien
dichotomy.' 61
The Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardsons62 declared the classification
of "aliens" a suspect category and stated that "a 'person' in [a fourteenth
amendment context] encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens, as well
as citizens of the United States, and entitles both citizens and aliens to equal
protection of the laws of the state in which they reside."'16 s Similarly, the
Court in In re Griflithso4 noted that "resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes,
support the economy, [and] serve in the Armed Forces .... It is appropriate
that a state bear a heavy burden [when regulating in this area] .. ,_"165It is
apparent in both cases that the Court did not intend to reach the issue of
the includability of nonresident aliens into this suspect category.
The Shames Court also summarily dismissed an equal protection argument
using the "states' jurisdiction" language to distinguish nonresident aliens.166
158. Id. at 1335. See also text following note 171 infra. Although this court's rationale
does not depend on whether the Supreme Court ultimately decides that nonresident aliens
have vested due process rights, if this vesting is clearly determined, the penalties- for violation
of a legitimate state statute precluding nonresident alien ownership of realty will have to
be examined. As noted by the dissent in Shames, 323 F. Supp. at 1344 .and the court in
Sardino, 361 F.2d at 111, there is a line of cases implying a violation of due process if
nonresident alien owned property is confiscated without compensation. See note 154
supra. This problem seems easily resolved by shaping a penalty that does not require
foreign-owned realty to escheat without compensation. For example, the statute might provide
that violators be fined, their illegally purchased realty escheat, and fair compensation be
paid to the foreign direct investor. Fair compensation could be set at the lesser of his
purchase price or the proceeds from the state's sale of the property, less the fine imposed.
159. U.S. CONsT. art. XIV, §1 (emphasis added). 160. See notes 143, 149 supra.
161. But see note 154 supra, discussing a territorial notion in the vesting of constitutional
rights.

162. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
163. Id. at 371.
164. 413 US. 717 (1973).
165. Id. at 722.
166. 323 F. Supp. at 133.

-
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Yet, while defending its finding that due process and equal protection did not
attach to nonresident aliens, the court noted that the California alien land
law upheld in Porterfield v. Webb167 was later declared unconstitutional by
the California supreme court on equal protection grounds. 168 This apparent
non sequitur is resolved by the true purpose of the California statute, which
was to preclude Japanese immigration. This racial discrimination was
recognized by the California supreme court's holding in Sei Fujii v. State. 69
Therein the court stated:
[T]he California alien land law is obviously designed and administered
as an instrument for effectuating racial discrimination. . . . There is
nothing to indicate that those alien residents ... as a class, might use

the land for purposes injurious to public morals, safety, or welfare

70

Similarly, as Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Griffiths, the thrust of
the California alien land law was to discriminate by country of origin and
thus "conflicts with the core purpose of the equal protection clause....

Consequently, Fujii did not reach the issue of due process at all. Furthermore,
it addressed only the racially discriminatory effects of the California statutes
on resident aliens and did not reach the fundamental question of whether
discrimination against nonresident aliens, as a class, would be repugnant to
the fourteenth amendment.
The precise issue of whether the fourteenth amendment will allow a foreign
direct investor in United States real estate to be precluded from purchasing
land or an interest in land has not come before the Court since Terrace and
its progeny, and the Court has taken no unequivocal action to overrule those
decisions when applied to nonresident aliens. The Court's affirmance of
Shames has strengthened future reliance on the Terrace holding. It thus
appears that regulation of F.D.I. in realty, even to the extent of preclusion,
falls within the bounds of the fourteenth amendment unless it is based on
the investor's race or country of origin.

167. 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
168. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 713, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); accord, Haruye Masaoka v.
People, 39 Cal. 2d 883, 245 P.2d 1062 (1952). The Oregon alien land law had previously
been declared unconstitutional by the Oregon supreme court in Kenji Namba v. McCourt,
204 P.2d 569 (Ore. 1949). Both Nambe and Fujii relied on Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948), which held the application of the California alien land law in a manner denying
a minor citizen the right to hold property because his parents were ineligible aliens to be
a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The state courts
further relied on Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), which held the
application of the California law in a manner precluding ineligible alien residents from
obtaining commercial fishing licenses (thus denying them the chance to work) to be
repugnant to equal protection. See generally Note, Immigrants, Aliens and the Constitution,
49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1075 (1914).

169.

38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See generally Ferguson, THE
35 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1947).
38 Cal. 2d at 737-38, 242 P.2d at 630 (emphasis added).
413 U.S. at 665.

CALIFORNIA ALIEN

LAND LAW AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,

170.
171.
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FederalPreemption
The most prevalent and potent methods of regulating F.D.I. in realty are
state laws. Yet the Constitution has delegated to the federal government the
exclusive power to act in the area of foreign affairs. 172 The notion that state
regulation of nonresident aliens could improperly infringe on this exclusive
power was forcefully established by the Supreme Court in Zschernigv. Miller 7 3
Zschernig concerned an Oregon statute regulating nonresident aliens' right
to inheritance that was alleged an invalid intrusion into the federal sphere
of foreign affairs. The Court, relying on Clark v. Alleny174 found this type
of reciprocity statute1 5 constitutional on its face but unconstitutional as
applied. The improper intrusions found by the Court consisted of comments
on the political systems, ideologies, and administrations of foreign governments in the state court's opinion on the reciprocity required by the Oregon
statute.176 The Supreme Court has continued to follow the Clark v. Allen
rationale by its affirmance of Shames, wherein the court interpreted Zschernig
as "meaning no more than judicial criticism of foreign governments is
constitutionally impermissible."' 77 Thus the Court, by its affirmance in
Shames, has not extended Zschernig beyond the "name calling" facts on which
it held, still leaving the states free to enact reciprocal inheritance legislation. 178
There is, however, a critical difference in the consequences of state restrictions on inheritance and restrictions on realty ownership. The effect of
a state requirement that reciprocity be accorded its citizens before a nonresident alien could inherit American property would have a minimal impact
on the United States as a nation. The country as a whole is not threatened
by the possibility that an American individual may lose inheritance rights
overseas because of retaliation. The United States economy is critically deU.S. CONsr. art 1, §8; see note 139 supra.
173. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
174. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). The Court in Clark held that the California statute, requiring
reciprocity as a condition precedent to inheritance, was not an unconstitutional infringe172.

ment on the federal foreign relations power. The Oregon statute's reciprocity provision
at issue in Zschernig was identical.
175. ORE. RnV. STAT. §111.070 (1965). The statute required that several criteria be
met before a nonresident alien could inherit from an Oregon citizen: (1) the existence
of a reciprocal right in the alien's country to take real and personal property; (2) the
reciprocal right to receive money originating from estates within the alien's country;
and (3) proof that the foreign recipient would receive "use, benefit, and control" of the
estate. See generally Comment, Inheritance by Non-Resident Aliens, 8 VA. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

419 (1968).
176. 389 U.S. at 503. See generally Inheritance of Nebraska Land, supra note 142,

at 318-20.,
177. 323 F. Supp. at 1332; accord, Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Mora v. Battin, 303 F. Supp. 666 (NJ). Ohio 1969); Goldstein v. Cox, 299 F. Supp.
1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
178. The Court in Shames quoted approvingly from Goldstein: "We appreciate that
the Supreme Court, may eventually, 'go further than it has thus far gone .

. .

. But

we conceive it to be our duty to enforce the law as it is, and not as it may be in the
future." 323 F. Supp. at 1332 (quoting Goldstein v. Cox, 299 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (S.D.N.Y.

1968)).
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7 9
Retaliation could have a
pendent on international trade and investment.'
dramatic impact on the entire country. A prime example was the 1973 oil
embargo. Adverse effects, however, are not always dramatic or apparent.
American reaction to Arab direct investment in the United States has been
80
used to justify, in part, the Arab boycott of firms doing business with Israel.'
Therefore, even if state alien land laws do not violate the fourteenth amendment, they patently interfere with the federal government's exclusive constitutional right to direct foreign relations. Moreover, the statutes at issue in
Zschernig and Shames guaranteed the nonresident aliens' rights to inherit
8
provided there was reciprocity in his home country.' ' Several states have
18 2
Nevertheless, these
similar reciprocity provisions in their alien land laws.
statutes, while analogous to the inheritance statutes, would still act in an
area of vital interest to the country as a whole and thus be distinguishable
from matters involving individual inheritance rights, which have little effect
on American foreign relations.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

One clear alternative to the current hodgepodge of state and federal regulation is for Congress to expressly legislate in this area. A second alternative is
federal preemption of the states' regulations. While the current bills before
l8 3
Congress do not directly address regulation of F.D.I. in realty, federal statutes
that establish a national scheme of regulation have been broadly construed
84
to preempt state law. The Supreme Court in Hines v. Davidowitz
acknowledged the preemption of a Pennsylvania statute that required alien
registration and held that the Nationality Act of 1940185 evidenced a congressional intent to form a national scheme for the regulation of aliens. The
Court further noted that "[o]ur system of government . . . imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely
free from local interference .... 18,16Another example of federal regulation in
F.D.I. is found in the purpose of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966,
8
which is, in part, to increase foreign direct investment in the United States;' 88
yet, state alien land laws certainly frustrate this congressional purpose.
179. See text accompanying note 38 supra. See generally Statement by Charles
Kindleberger, in Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 126.
180. FORTUNE, July 1975, at 170.
181. See notes 142, 175 supra.

P.

182. See note 73 supra, Group 11.
183. See note 34 supra.
184. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
185. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq. (1970).
186. 312 U.S. at 63. The Court had previously stated in United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937), that "complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the
part of the several states." Id. al. 331.
187. S. REP. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., in 1966 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 4446,
4454; see House Hearings,supra note 21, at 241.

188. See text accompanying note 35 supra, for the Administration's position encouraging
the free flow of international investment. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
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A third alternative is for the Supreme Court to extend the rationale
established by Zschernig that a federal common law regulates the areas of
exclusive federal jurisdiction; in this context, foreign relations as affected by
F.D.I. in American realty. This solution would preempt state action even if
Congress does not speak in this area. 8 9 However, there exist several other
areas where state action has a great potential for affecting foreign relations.
The most notable of these are recognition of foreign country judgments and
concern over private international law. Although these areas require state
courts to evaluate foreign countries' legal systems and have a potential for
abuse analogous to such inquiries as those found impermissible by the Supreme
Court in Zschernig,thus far the states' jurisdiction has not been challenged. 190
Of course, because these state actions affecting foreign relations have not been
challenged does not mean that they cannot be preempted. The key question is
the encroachment effect of the states' actions on the federal foreign relations
power. It is on this issue of the regulation's effect- that state regulation of
F.D.I. in United States realty is distinguishable from state action in recognition
of foreign money judgments or private international law.
While there is good cause to preserve the states' powers to protect their
citizens, F.D.I. is still significantly more crucial to the nation as a whole than
the recognition of money judgments within a single state. One or more
states' restrictions on F.D.I. might well invoke retaliation affecting the entire
United States.' 9 ' Even if reciprocal "rights" exist pursuant to an F.C.N. treaty
or executive agreement, an affected United States direct investor abroad may
not want to force the issue of responding to this retaliation through federal

(1972); Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE LJ.
248.
189. This remely introduces the issue of whether there exists a federal judicial power
to develop rules for problems bearing on foreign relations. Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts have been faced with this issue of developing a specific
federal common law. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943);
D'Oench Duhme &Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942). The Court addressed
this issue in a foreign relations context in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964). Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, stated that: "If federal authority in
this instance, this Court, orders the field of judicial competence in this area for the federal
courts, and the state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind
the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronounceCONsrrruON 203-48

ment on the subject." Id. at 424. See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie -and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Hill, The Law Making Power of the
Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 CoLo. L. REy. 1024 (1967); Hirsch, Toward
a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 (1972).

190. Private international law concerns the conflict of laws among nations. Currently,
the state courts make decisions that touch foreign affairs because they must determine
whether a foreign court has exercised due process before honoring the foreign country
judgment. See generally Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement
of Conflicts Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220 (1972).

191. The United States is generally treated as a single entity by foreign nations. See
Bergman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 257, 269 (1962). But see

F.C.N. treaties, supra note 81. Even if a treaty provides that the foreign signatory may
retaliate reciprocally with a-single state, that country, depending on its bargaining position,
would still appear to have the option to go against thie 64tire Us-itcd States.
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192
diplomatic channels for fear of further reprisals by the host government.
Further, the United States Government may not wish to raise the matter too
forcefully, in order to preserve political and economic relationships with the
host country. 93 Whatever conflicts that might arise would, nevertheless, have
to be negotiated at the federal level due to the federal government's exclusive
jurisdiction over foreign affairs.19 4 Therefore, it is crucially important that
the right to invest transcend any state's desire to retain power in this field.
There is a fourth possible course of action concerning those statutes that
require reciprocity before allowing nonresident aliens to purchase land. 95
This course of action is premised on the Bernstein9 6 exception to the Act of
State doctrine.' 9 7 This approach would allow the judiciary, when required to
evaluate a foreign country's political or economic regulation of F.D.I., to
defer to the federal executive branch for a determination of the foreign
relations impact of these judicial actions. By taking judicial notice of the
executive branch's findings, the courts could make a determination that would
be consistent with national foreign policy objectives. 198 The Supreme Court,
however, has taken a dim view of presidential intervention into judicial
affairs. In Zschernig, for instance, the Court ignored statements made by
both the State and Justice Departments to the effect that state inheritance
statutes did not interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs1 99 In the decision
of First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,20 0 six of the Justices
expressed an aversion to allowing the executive branch's participation in
judicial determinations by way of the Bernstein exception. 20 1 Thus it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would permit such pervasive presidential influence on the judiciary that a case-by-case determination of F.D.I. would require.
CONCLUSION

The history of state alien land laws since the Revolution clearly shows
that restrictions on F.D.I. in realty have been topical, cyclical responses to
temporal events. The road back to rationality after these reactions has been
192.

See generally 1965

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION

PROCEEDINS

OF THE SEcTION

(REPORT OF CoMMrITEE

ON

ON

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

TREATIES)

LAW OF THE
215.

193. See King, supra note 115, at 64. These factors have led to a conclusion that "the
concept of national treatment as set forth in most of these [F.C.N.] treaties has not been
a fully effective device for the protection of investors." Id.

194. See note 139 supra.
195. See note 73 supra, Group II.
196. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
197. See generally Delson, The Act of State Doctrine -Judicial Defense or Abstention?,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972); Metzger, The State Department's Role in the Judicial Administration of the Act of State Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1972).
198. See Note, Reciprocity and Retention Statutes -A New Direction?, 22 RtrrG s L.
REy. 770, 782-86 (1968).
199. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 36 U.S.L.W. 4120, 4121, 4129.
200. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
201. Id. See generally Lowenfeld, Act of State and Department of State: First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 (1972).
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long and difficult. Regardless of the past, F.D.L in United States realty has recently been on the increase, a trend that is likely to continue. This rise in F.D.I.
is predominately due to five factors: (1) economic advantages of productivity
in the American market, (2) the availability of scarce raw materials, (3) the
promotion of investment within the United States by state and federal
governments, 2 2 (4) the devaluation of the dollar and world economic disequilibrium, and (5) the abundance of OPEC monetary reserves that require
investment.203 Although these factors may not be permanent shifts in the

world investment picture, their effect will be significant even in a short-run
application on our economy.
By analyzing Canada's scheme of regulation, insight can be gained into
what may occur if short term fears are permitted to control decision making.204
Congress has taken a significant step by establishing and funding a major
analysis.of E.D.Is impact on .the United States- 0°5. nevertheless,_it.Must-be
remembered that Canada prepared the Grey Reeport 20o yet failed to prevent
a xenophobic reaction in the provinces. As long as the several- states have
an independent power to regulate the F.D.I. in real estate, they will have a
concomitant power to regulate United States foreign policy. In today's world,
economic power is arguably more potent than physical strength;2 07 with the
great United States economic exposure abroad, it is in our best interest to
have the federal government regulate F.D.I. This is not a cry for the diminution of federalism or the abrogation of states' rights. It is merely an
acknowledgment that the Constitution has delegated the management of our
foreign relations to the federal government, and state land laws are con208
trary to that effectuation.
The federal government must be aware that transnational interaction
should be firmly grounded on fairness and reciprocity. Escalating retaliation
would not serve any country's long-run economic goals. New restrictions
on F.D.I. by the United States might encourage allegations of economic
"hypocrisy," undermining United States credibility abroad. Conversely, there
are benefits that would accrue from a free flow in international investment

202.
203.
204.

See House Hearings,supra note 21, at 249-51.
See Statutory Controls, supra note 34, at 174.
See text accompanying notes 96-110 supra.

205. Act of October 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-478, 88 Stat. 1450.
206. THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972).
207. The most dramatic use of an economic weapon against the United States was
the Arab oil embargo of 1973. After analyzing the legal issues in this economic coercion,
a commentator stated: "[I]t may be reasonably concluded that the oil embargo employed
by the Arab oil producing states (OAPEC) was not a breach of customary international law,
of any international agreement among the participants, or any pertinent United Nations
obligations." Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon
and the Ensuing Juridicial Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 205, 231 (1974).
208. This acknowledgment is not a novel interpretation of the Constitution. The Vermont

supreme court in 1859 stated: "[Tihe right to interfere with aliens holding real estate in
this country, strictly and appropriately belongs to the national and not to the state
5overeignty." State v. Boston C. & X4.R.R., 25 Vt, .4330,49 (1859).
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capital. For example, investment of Mideast capital reserves in the United
209
States could create a common desire for a stable American economy.
The evidence clearly indicates an increase of F.D.I. in United States real
estate, yet the amount of this investment and the identity of the investors remains undisclosed. Congress has moved to ascertain the extent of F.D.I. in
realty by enacting the Foreign Investment Study Act,210 and there are bills
currently before Congress that would require disclosure by foreign direct
investors. 211 With such information at hand and with an understanding of
the interdependence of transnational investment, the federal government will
be properly armed to shape a national policy based on economic and legal
principles rather than the historical xenophobia.
WILLIAM
209.
210.
211.

A.

WEBER

See Statutory Controls. supra note 34, at 186.
See note 205 supra.
See note 34supra.
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